Dr. Diego Acosta is a Professor of Migration Law at the University of Bristol. He is also the Director of the Global Chair Nebrija/Santander on Migration and Human Rights at Nebrija University in Madrid. He has written extensively on free movement regimes, as well as on international and comparative migration law. He has also provided advisory services to several governments and regional organizations on migration law and the free movement of people, including in Africa, Europe, and South America.

 

Ruth: How does the Free Move Hub distinguish between Free Movement Regimes (FMRs), Visa Liberalization Regimes (VLRs), and Labor Mobility Schemes (LMS)? Why is it important to categorize these regimes separately rather than grouping them under a broad “free movement” label?

Diego: If you look at the Global Compact for Migration—Objective 5 of the Global Compact for Migration, to be precise—it talks about adopting tools so that migration is regular, safe, and orderly. This is the IOM’s motto, but it’s also the objective of the Global Compact for Migration. Adopted in 2018, it was endorsed by most countries in the world. Actually, the only country in Africa that opposed the Global Compact for Migration is Algeria. All the other countries either voted in favor of the compact in the General Assembly in 2018 or abstained. However, some of them didn’t really abstain—they simply didn’t have a representative present at the voting. This doesn’t mean they opposed the compact.

Remember, the compact is a soft law instrument. It’s not an international treaty; it’s not legally binding. But when you look at Objective 5, if we think the compact is about making migration safe, orderly, and regular, many commentators—including one of the former UN Rapporteurs on the Rights of Migrants, François Crépeau—have argued that the most important objective (the compact has 23 objectives) is Objective 5. It essentially states that if we want to make migration safe, regular, and orderly, we need to adopt what they call mobility or migration pathways. Legal mechanisms must exist so that migration is possible. Migration becomes irregular, disorderly, and unsafe when people do not move through legal means.

For example, if you look at the European Union and the arrival of Ukrainians, they are simply entering through the border. They have the right to enter, the right to work, the right to reside, the right to education for their children, and the right to access healthcare. Thus, you don’t see any Ukrainians dying at the EU border or using smugglers to enter. This is because they have the right to enter in a safe, orderly, and regular manner.

If you compare that to the experience of Syrians during the emergency in 2015–16, we saw many people drowning in the Mediterranean and making very long trips to reach the EU through the Balkans. Objective 5 of the compact is, therefore, the most important, in my view, because it talks about the commitment by states that have endorsed it to open more mobility pathways. One possibility is Visa Liberalization Agreements. Let’s use two countries as an example, Nigeria and South Africa. You need a visa to go to South Africa. Imagine a bilateral agreement between these countries similar to the bilateral agreement that has now been signed between South Africa and Kenya a few months ago. It would allow South Africans to visit Nigeria for business or tourist purposes—or vice versa—for up to 90 days without needing a visa. They would simply arrive at the border with their passport and would enter without the need to possess a prior visa.

That is a Visa Liberalization Agreement. That doesn’t mean that once you enter South Africa, you have the right to stay or work there. That is not what the visa liberalization agreement does. The second possibility that the compact talks about is Labor Mobility Agreements. For example, between Ecuador and Spain, the latter country might say, “We need 3,000 nurses or hospital workers, and since we know you have those workers, we are going to sign a bilateral labor agreement.” This allows Ecuadorian nurses—up to a specified number—to come and work in Spain. Labor mobility agreements are very limited in the category of workers, focus on temporary situations, and often include quota systems.

The third category is Free Movement Regimes. This is the most expansive of the three categories. However, the Global Compact does not define “free movement regime,” which is what we address in the Free Move Hub. We consider FMRs as being different from Visa Liberalization Agreements and Labor Mobility Schemes. A free movement regime, by its own terminology, tells you it is more than visa liberalization or labor mobility—otherwise, we wouldn’t need this separate category.

What we have done at the Free Move Hub is to identify examples of free movement regimes globally. Our project focuses on these regimes on paper—we do not analyze their implementation. For example, ECOWAS is one of our multilateral free movement regimes. When examining the norms on paper, the components of a free movement regime, at a minimum, allow the right to enter, the right to reside, and the right to work in another participating state, provided you are a national of one of those states. We look at this on paper, not in practice. We have identified that 111 countries globally are part of legally binding bilateral or multilateral free movement regimes. There are around 55 free movement regimes in place today. In our definition, a free movement regime is a treaty or collection of treaties that allows nationals of participating states—not just specific labor categories—the right to enter, reside, and work in other member states.

Ruth: What do you think about the concept of the African Union Free Movement Protocol? We have only four countries that have ratified it, and various challenges have been presented as to why it hasn’t progressed. With this extensive explanation you’ve given, I believe there’s so much more information available that could make progress easier. Do you think there is any specific theme hindering its ratification—not just in Africa, but globally in other free movement regimes as well?

Diego: I think that in the case of Africa there are three or four misconceptions about what a free movement regime is and what happens when you ratify one. The first thing to clarify is that free movement regimes are not open borders. This is very important. Whether it’s the African Union free movement protocol, ECOWAS, the EAC, or the European Union, free movement regimes facilitate mobility only for nationals of participating states. This does not mean participating states cannot deny entry or expel nationals from other member states—for example, if they are deemed a threat to public policy or security. All free movement regimes include rules allowing such measures.

Moreover, if the protocol is ever fully adopted with the necessary 15 ratifications, mobility will apply only between those countries. Ratifying the protocol does not mean any African can enter your state—only nationals of ratifying countries will have those rights.

The second point is that free movement regimes do not necessarily lead to more migration. Migration depends on economic conditions and opportunities. For instance, Argentina has the most comprehensive free movement regime in South America, yet its foreign population remains at 4.2% because its economy does not attract migrants.

Ruth: How do these regimes compare globally, particularly between South America and Africa?

Diego: Africa has extensive experience with free movement regimes. Currently, 35 African countries are part of a legally binding free movement regime. However, these regimes are often not implemented in practice. Africa’s approach to free movement is rooted in its history and international agreements. Globally, the expansion of free movement regimes has been significant in the 21st century. In Latin America and the Caribbean, none of the 33 countries were part of functioning free movement regimes in 2000. Today, 25 are. Europe and the post-Soviet regions have seen similar growth.

Ruth: How does the Free Move Hub contribute to transparency and understanding for policymakers and citizens?

Diego: The Free Move Hub clarifies the rights associated with free movement regimes. For instance, if the FMP is ratified, domestic laws must ensure citizens of participating states can exercise those rights. Our goal is to provide clear, accessible and free information that informs not only policymakers, lawyers and judges, but also the average man as well to support implementation.

As my conversation with Dr. Diego draws to a close, it is important to note his insights highlight the vital role of free movement regimes in facilitating safe, orderly, and legal migration across regions. His work with the Free Move Hub underscores the importance of clear categorization and understanding of migration frameworks, such as Free Movement Regimes (FMRs), Visa Liberalization Regimes (VLRs), and Labor Mobility Schemes (LMS). By providing a comparative and transparent analysis of these regimes globally, the Free Move Hub serves as an essential tool for policymakers, researchers, and citizens alike. It not only fosters a deeper understanding of the opportunities and challenges surrounding regional mobility but also encourages political will and practical implementation to unlock the full potential of migration for economic growth and regional integration. Through projects like the Free Move Hub, the path toward a more interconnected world, especially in Africa, becomes increasingly achievable.

 

You can visit the Free Move Hub for more information.

 

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